The Onion Dilemma
The Onion Dilemma is a game-theory-based supply chain simulation set in the volatile Indian onion market. It models repeated interactions between a Farmer Cooperative based in Nashik, Maharashtra, and a Retail Chain operating in Delhi NCR. In each round, both parties make simultaneous pricing and procurement decisions under incomplete information — the Farmer Cooperative choosing between a fair price and an inflated price, and the Retail Chain choosing between full and partial procurement. A dynamic Trust Index tracks the cumulative history of cooperation and defection, shaping strategic incentives as the simulation progresses.
The simulation unfolds in distinct phases: baseline gameplay that establishes initial cooperation patterns, followed by event-driven rounds introducing a secondary vendor price increase, an optional exclusive contract with defection penalties, and an optional cooperation bonus. Together, these phases demonstrate how external pressures and contractual mechanisms alter strategic equilibria — and why rational short-term defection so often undermines long-term relationship value.
- Apply Prisoner’s Dilemma to supply decisions
- Track trust via cooperation history
- Balance short vs long-term payoffs
- Design contracts to shape incentives
- Use reputation to guide strategy
- Supports two-player mode for direct participant interaction and single-player mode against configurable computer-controlled bots (tit-for-tat, always cooperate, always defect, or random)
- Dynamic Trust Index that tracks the cumulative history of cooperation and defection, influencing costs, salvage values, and strategic options across rounds
- Multi-phase structure: baseline rounds followed by event-driven phases introducing secondary vendor competition, exclusive contracts with penalties, and cooperation bonuses
- Fully customisable parameters including market volatility, Trust Index decay rate, bot behaviour, and event timing
- Post-simulation analytics showing each participant's complete decision trail, profit trajectory, and Trust Index evolution
- Internalise how rational short-term defection systematically undermines long-term relationship value in repeated supply chain interactions
- Recognise that supply chain conflicts frequently emerge from Prisoner's Dilemma incentive structures rather than managerial incompetence
- Understand how trust erodes through repeated rational self-interest and how well-designed contracts can restore cooperative equilibria
- Develop the ability to use trust metrics as active inputs to strategic decision-making under uncertainty
- Appreciate the cumulative, compounding nature of cooperation and defection across repeated interactions
